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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellant Gerold Oliver ("Oliver") appeals from the final 
judgment and sentence imposed by the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey for stealing 
Government property with a value in excess of $20,000 in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 641- 642. This Court has appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C S 1291. The question for 
decision is this: when a criminal complaint has been 
pending for some months and is dismissed, and ther eafter 
an indictment issues charging offenses not contained in the 
dismissed complaint but arising out of the same criminal 
transaction, does the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. SS 3161 et 
seq., require dismissal of the indictment? We hold that the 
answer is no. 
 
The facts are simple and set up well the issue. In 1994, 
Oliver worked as a maintenance supervisor for the United 
States Postal Service (the "Postal Service") in Newark, New 
Jersey. On August 17, 1994, a co-worker threatened his 
life, leaving Oliver emotionally distraught and unable to 
return to work for the Postal Service. Hefiled for total 
disability benefits with the United States Department of 
Labor's Office of Workers' Compensation Pr ograms (the 
"Department") on August 23, 1994. His application was 
approved on October 11, 1994, and he was given notice 
that he should notify the Department if he r eturned to any 
employment. Over the course of the next six months, Oliver 
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completed nine forms to update his disability status with 
the Department. On eight of them he responded that 
requests for information regar ding whether he was 
employed were not applicable; on one he left the question 
blank. In fact, however, Oliver was working as a registered 
nurse at various area hospitals during the period of time 
when he received total disability benefits. 
 
The Department learned of this discrepancy in June of 
1995 and discontinued benefits. By that time, Oliver had 
received $24,133.80 in total disability benefits. On January 
23, 1996, the Government filed a criminal complaint 
against Oliver charging that he "knowingly falsified, 
concealed, covered up, and made fraudulent statements in 
connection with the application for benefits" in violation of 
18 U.S.C. SS 1920-1922 and 18 U.S.C. SS 1001-1002. After 
a series of continuances, however, the Gover nment moved 
to dismiss its own complaint, which a magistrate judge 
granted without prejudice on March 8, 1999. 
 
On May 11, 1999, a federal grand jury in Newark 
indicted Oliver on a new charge not contained in the 
original complaint: one count of embezzling, stealing, 
purloining or converting Government pr operty in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. SS 641-642. Oliver moved to dismiss the 
indictment before trial on the ground that it violated the 
Speedy Trial Act, but the District Court denied the motion 
on September 7, 1999. A jury trial began on September 13, 
1999. Oliver renewed his motion to dismiss the indictment 
at the close of the Government's case, and the motion was 
denied again. The jury returned a ver dict of guilty on 
September 14, 1999. Oliver again renewed his motion to 
dismiss the indictment and moved for judgment of acquittal 
on the ground that the jury's verdict was against the weight 
of the evidence. Both motions were denied. On December 
13, 1999, the District Court sentenced Oliver to seven 
months imprisonment, three years supervised r elease, and 
seven months in a community treatment center . Oliver 
appealed. 
 
On appeal, Oliver raises two issues: (1) whether the 
indictment against him should have been dismissed 
because it violates the time limits imposed by the Speedy 
Trial Act, and (2) whether he should have been acquitted 
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because the jury's verdict is unsupported by sufficient 
evidence. We find the second issue quickly resolved. A 
violation of S 641 may be established if the defendant 
"embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his 
use" Government property. 18 U.S.C.S 641. After reviewing 
the record and the parties' briefs, we ar e convinced that the 
jury had substantial evidence to conclude that Oliver stole 
property of the Government by intentionally deceiving it 
about his continued employment as a register ed nurse 
during the period of time he received total disability 
benefits. 
 
Turning to the Speedy Trial Act issue, we conclude that 
the District Court did not err when it denied Oliver's 
motions to dismiss the indictment. The Speedy T rial Act 
requires that the Government file an indictment or 
information against a defendant "within thirty days from 
the date on which such individual was arrested or served 
with a summons in connection with such charges." 18 
U.S.C. S 3161(b). If the Government fails to comply with 
this time limit, the Act requires the dismissal of charges in 
the complaint. 18 U.S.C. S 3162(a)(1) ("If, in the case of any 
individual against whom a complaint is filed char ging such 
individual with an offense, no indictment or information is 
filed within the time limit required . .. , such charge 
against the individual contained in such complaint shall be 
dismissed or otherwise dropped."). 
 
Oliver argues that the indictment char ging him with 
violating 18 U.S.C. SS 641-642 should have been dismissed 
as an invalid evasion of the time limits imposed by the 
Speedy Trial Act. He asserts that the Gover nment brought 
charges under SS 641-642 only because the original charges 
against him under 18 U.S.C. SS 1920-1922 and 18 U.S.C. 
SS 1001-1002 were time-barred under the Act. He also 
argues that the evidence of a run-around is clear because 
the charges in the indictment are based on the same 
underlying conduct as the initial complaint. 
 
However, our review of decisions by other courts of 
appeals reveals a consensus that the Speedy T rial Act 
requires the dismissal of only those char ges that were made 
in the original complaint that triggered the thirty-day time 
period. See United States v. Miller, 23 F .3d 194, 199 (8th 
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Cir. 1994) ("A defendant's arrest on one charge does not 
necessarily trigger the right to a speedy trial on another 
charge filed after his arrest."); United States v. Nabors, 901 
F.2d 1351, 1355 (6th Cir. 1990) ("18 U.S.C. S 3162(a)(1) 
only requires the dismissal of the of fense charged in the 
complaint . . . ."); United States v. Giwa , 831 F.2d 538, 541 
(5th Cir. 1987) ("The Act requir es dismissal of only those 
charges contained in the original complaint."); United States 
v. Napolitano, 761 F.2d 135, 137 (2d Cir . 1985) ("The 
statutory language is clear: it requires dismissal only of 
`such charge against the individual contained in such 
complaint.' "); United States v. Heldt, 745 F.2d 1275, 1280 
(9th Cir. 1984) ("Charges not included in the original 
complaint are not covered by the Act . . .."); United States 
v. Pollock, 726 F.2d 1456, 1462 (9th Cir . 1984) ("We hold 
that when the government fails to indict a defendant within 
30 days of arrest, section 3162(a)(1) r equires dismissal of 
only the offense or offenses char ged in the original 
complaint."); United States v. Brooks , 670 F.2d 148, 151 
(11th Cir. 1982) ("An arrest triggers the running of 
S 3161(b) of the Speedy Trial Act only if the arrest is for the 
same offense for which the accused is subsequently 
indicted."). Moreover, courts have r ejected the application of 
the transactional test suggested by Oliver and point out 
that Congress itself considered and r ejected this option. 
See, e.g., United States v. Derose , 74 F.3d 1177, 1184 (11th 
Cir. 1996) ("Congress consider ed and declined to follow the 
suggestion that the Speedy Trial Act's dismissal sanctions 
should be applied to a subsequent charge if it arose from 
the same criminal transaction or event as those detailed in 
the initial complaint or were known or r easonably should 
have been known at the time of filing the initial 
complaint."); Napolitano, 761 F.2d at 137 ("[T]he legislative 
history of the Act clearly indicates that Congr ess considered 
and rejected defendant's suggestion that the Act's dismissal 
sanction be applied to subsequent charges if they arise 
from the same criminal episode as those specified in the 
original complaint or were known or reasonably should 
have been known at the time of the complaint."). We agree 
with and adopt the position of these courts of appeals. 
Accordingly, we affirm the District Court's decision not to 
dismiss the indictment against Oliver which contained no 
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overlapping charges with the original complaint against 
him. 
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